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     Models  of  the  monetary  transmission mechanism often generate empirically 
implausible business fluctuations. This paper analyzes the role of on-the-job search in 
the propagation of monetary shocks in a sticky price model with labor market search 
frictions. Such frictions induce long-term employment relationships, such that the real 
marginal cost is determined by real wages and the cost of an employment relationship. 
On-the-job search opens up an extra channel of employment growth that dampens the 
response of these two components. Because real marginal cost rigidity induces small 
price adjustments, on-the-job search gives rise to a strong propagation of monetary 
shocks that increases output persistence. 
 
 
Keywords: On-the-job search, cost of an employment relationship, sticky prices, 
business fluctuations 
 
JEL Classification: E24, E31, E32 
                                                 
    
 I am especially grateful to Daniele Coen-Pirani, Marvin Goodfriend, Bennett McCallum, 
associate editor Thomas Lubik, and an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved 
this paper. I also thank Michelle Alexopoulos, Hafedh Bouakez, Michael Krause, Christopher 
Sleet, Tack Yun, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, HEC Montreal, the 2009 Missouri Economics Conference, the 2009 and 
2006 Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting, and the 2008 North American Summer Meeting of 
the Econometric Society, for helpful comments. Financial support from a William Larimer 
Mellon fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are solely those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
or the Federal Reserve System.  
    Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, One Memorial Drive, Kansas 
City, MO 64198, USA. Tel: +1 816 881 2766. Fax: +1 816 881 2199. E-mail: 
willem.vanzandweghe@kc.frb.org. 
 1 Introduction
There is a widespread view in the monetary business cycle literature that optimizing sticky price
models need to be augmented with a source of real marginal cost rigidity in order to generate
empirically plausible dynamics.1 The marginal cost of production connects the labor market
and in°ation. If the structure of the labor market renders ¯rms' marginal cost unresponsive
to a change in production, the ensuing in°ation adjustment can be sluggish. In that case,
monetary shocks can be propagated to yield persistent e®ects on real economic activity.
A recent literature has studied the dynamics of real marginal cost, in°ation and output in
sticky price models with labor market search and matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994).2 The labor market frictions make employment adjustment costly, thus
increasing the sensitivity of marginal cost to a demand-induced increase in real activity. In
particular, such frictions give rise to a surplus from a match between a worker and a ¯rm, which
induces a long-term employment relationship. Consequently, the marginal cost is determined
by the cost of an employment relationship, i.e. the cost of hiring a worker net of the expected
saving of future hiring costs, in addition to the real wage. To expand production, ¯rms must
increase their hiring by posting vacancies, and as vacancies rise and unemployment declines
the labor market tightens. If real wages are set so as to split the surplus of the match, then
the tighter labor market leads to higher wages. But it also raises the cost of an employment
relationship, since hiring is relatively expensive when the labor market is tight. Therefore, both
components contribute to a rise in marginal cost.
This paper revisits the question of whether search frictions are a source of real marginal
cost rigidity by studying the role of on-the-job search for marginal cost dynamics. Employer-to-
employer transitions are an important part of U.S. labor market °ows. Fallick and Fleischman
(2004) use the Current Population Survey to construct a measure of employer-to-employer
°ows. They ¯nd that 2.6 percent of employed workers change employers in an average month.
That is about as large as the °ow of workers leaving employment out of the labor force and twice
1Empirical responses to monetary shocks are documented in an extensive vector autoregression literature; see
e.g. Christiano et al. (1999). There is a large literature that studies the so-called persistence problem of models
with staggered price setting; see e.g. Chari et al. (2000).
2Examples include Christo®el and Linzert (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2007), who study the role of real
wage rigidity. The latter authors ¯nd that search frictions per se do not improve the ability of a sticky price
model to explain the persistent e®ects of monetary shocks. Walsh (2005) shows that search frictions a®ect the
dynamics of real marginal cost to the e®ect of augmenting the persistence in output and in°ation in a model
with habit persistence in consumption preferences and price indexing to past in°ation. Krause et al. (2008)
and Ravenna and Walsh (2008) focus on estimation of a New Keynesian Phillips curve, whereas Sveen and
Weinke (2007) and Trigari (2009) analyze the role of the intensive and extensive margin. An early exploration
is conducted by Walsh (2003).
2as large as the °ow of workers moving from employment to unemployment, so that employer-
to-employer transitions make up 39 percent of separations. Nagyp¶ al (2008) studies employer-
to-employer transitions in the Survey of Income and Program Participation and calculates that
they account for 49 percent of separations. Moreover, these transitions are highly procyclical,
as also emphasized by Shimer (2005b).
The magnitude and procyclicality of this job-to-job °ow of workers suggests that accounting
for it may substantially diminish the sensitivity of the components of marginal cost to monetary
shocks. The reason is that if workers can search on-the-job for more productive and valuable
jobs, they become a source of employment growth in addition to unemployed workers. If this
pool of employed searchers expands during periods of booming economic activity, it moder-
ates the tightening of the labor market that occurs as ¯rms post vacancies aiming to expand
employment. By dampening the labor market tightening, such positive comovement between
vacancy creation and on-the-job search can induce sluggishness in the rise of wages and the
cost of an employment relationship. As a result, a monetary expansion leads to a mitigated
increase in marginal cost and hence in in°ation. That ampli¯es the e®ect of the shock on ag-
gregate demand and thus strengthens ¯rms' incentive to post vacancies. The increased vacancy
posting fuels the boom and thus further stimulates on-the-job search. This complementarity
turns on-the-job search into a propagation mechanism that can generate large °uctuations in
the vacancy-unemployment ratio, which translates into strong employment and output growth.
This reasoning is borne out by the quantitative analysis of a sticky price model with search
frictions. The analysis shows that when workers can search on-the-job, a monetary shock
induces a dampened response of the components of marginal cost, and thus of marginal cost
and in°ation. Under a baseline calibration, the impact response of in°ation is reduced by about
half. The resulting e®ect on aggregate demand almost doubles the impact response of output
and the output response displays a hump-shaped pattern. Model simulations correspondingly
show a substantial reduction of °uctuations in in°ation, marginal cost and its components
relative to output. Thus, on-the-job search constitutes a powerful propagation mechanism of
monetary shocks. This ¯nding is in stark contrast with the result of Krause and Lubik (2007)
that introducing an exogenous source of real wage rigidity into a labor market with search
frictions has only minor e®ects on the dynamics of marginal cost. If wage rigidity is imposed,
the change in surplus of a match generated by a monetary shock accrues largely to the ¯rm and
increases the incentive to adjust vacancies. That ampli¯es the tightening of the labor market
and hence ampli¯es the °uctuations in the cost of an employment relationship.
Allowing workers to search on-the-job also leads the model to more accurately reproduce
cyclical properties of the U.S. labor market. Simulation of the model economy with on-the-
job search shows that the size of °uctuations in unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy-
3unemployment ratio comes close to the large °uctuations observed in the U.S. data. In addition,
the complementarity of on-the-job search and vacancy creation produces a more persistent
response of the labor market variables and generates a negative correlation between vacancies
and unemployment (i.e. the Beveridge curve).
New matches become productive instantaneously in the model, but the above conclusions
based on model simulations are robust to the more conventional timing where such matches
become productive in the subsequent period.3 In contrast, when workers cannot search on-the-
job the timing assumption a®ects the labor market dynamics substantially. With instantaneous
productivity of new matches, a shock provokes a large but short-lived adjustment in vacancy
creation on impact. This response produces a large volatility of vacancies and labor market
tightness, even when generated by productivity shocks, but it also yields a negative autocor-
relation of vacancies and fails to produce a Beveridge curve.4 If instead new matches become
productive with a lag, productivity shocks generate larger autocorrelation in labor market
variables and a Beveridge curve, but fail to amplify °uctuations in the labor market, re°ecting
the lack of propagation that is emphasized by Shimer (2005a). Thus, each timing assumption
introduces a distinct de¯ciency in the standard labor market with search frictions, which is over-
come when workers can search on-the-job. With on-the-job search the timing assumption is
crucial for determining the e®ect of price stickiness on the transmission of productivity shocks
to the labor market. An increase in price stickiness ampli¯es the volatility of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio due to productivity shocks if new matches produce instantaneously, but
reduces it if the new matches start producing with a lag.
A few recent models of labor market search and matching frictions show that on-the-job
search can amplify the °uctuations in vacancies, unemployment, and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio due to productivity shocks. In Tasci's (2007) model, imperfect information about the
match quality provides a motive for on-the-job search. Employed and unemployed workers
search for jobs without incurring a search cost, and posting more vacancies makes ¯rms more
likely to contact either employed or unemployed workers. When productivity is high, more
low-quality matches survive, which gives rise to procyclical transitions from low quality to high
quality jobs. According to Nagyp¶ al (2007), an idiosyncratic job-satisfaction value provides an
3If new matches become productive with a lag, and without another margin of instantaneous production
adjustment, a shift in aggregate demand produces an implausibly large impact on marginal cost, its components,
and in°ation.
4The strong impact response of vacancies in the absence of on-the-job search arises because ¯rms adjust
employment in the face of a predetermined stock of unemployed workers, so an initial change in matches results
from a change in vacancies only. The timing assumption is also adopted in models with wage bargaining by e.g.
Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2010), Krause et al. (2008), Ravenna and Walsh (2008), Sveen and Weinke (2007), and
Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008), but none of these papers evaluates the model in terms of labor market
°uctuations. Rotemberg (2008) studies a model with wage posting.
4incentive for workers to search on-the-job. Firms are more likely to retain employed workers
than workers hired from the unemployment pool, because the former have a higher job satis-
faction. Then, ¯rms prefer to hire employed workers because they incur a hiring cost after a
match is made. Krause and Lubik (2006) propose a labor market model with both good and
bad jobs, which pay di®erent wages due to di®erences in the cost of vacancy creation. Workers
in bad jobs search for good jobs, because the latter have a higher productivity and pay a higher
wage. In the latter two models, the job-to-job transition rate is procyclical because searching
workers increase their search e®ort in response to a rise in the job ¯nding rate. A positive
productivity shock induces ¯rms to post vacancies, which raises the job ¯nding rate, and the
ensuing increase in on-the-job search mitigates the tightening of the labor market and thus
encourages ¯rms to post more vacancies. The present paper introduces Krause and Lubik's
speci¯cation of the labor market into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. This labor
market speci¯cation allows reproducing the large and procyclical job-to-job °ows that are a
salient fact of the U.S. labor market, while retaining the tractability of the New Keynesian
model because heterogeneity is limited to two types of jobs.
The paper proceeds as follows. A sticky price model with on-the-job search is presented in
Section 2. In Section 3 the model is analyzed quantitatively to assess the role of on-the-job
search. Section 4 contains a robustness analysis with respect to the timing of matching and
production and key parameter values. Section 5 adds some concluding remarks.
2 A sticky price model with on-the-job search
This section describes the labor market, the household and ¯rm optimization problems, and the
wage determination. There are ¯nal good producing ¯rms that set nominal prices subject to
price rigidity, and intermediate good producing ¯rms that hire in the frictional labor market.5
2.1 The labor market
There are two types of jobs: a high wage (\good") job and a low wage (\bad") job. The cost of
creating a job by any ¯rm is represented by the °ow cost of posting a vacancy: Pt°g for good
jobs and Pt°b for bad jobs, where °g > °b and Pt is the aggregate price index at time t. In the
presence of search frictions these costs give rise to di®erent surpluses of a match in each type
of job.
At the beginning of a period, a proportion ½ 2 (0;1) of existing matches ng;t¡1;nb;t¡1 is
exogenously destroyed before matching starts. Unemployed workers decide ex ante toward
5The separation of pricing and hiring decisions is a common simplifying assumption in this literature. Kuester
(2007), Sveen and Weinke (2007), and Thomas (2009) study real rigidities that arise from joint pricing and hiring
decisions.
5which type of job they direct their search e®ort, and subsequently meet vacant jobs randomly
in the matching market for that type of job. Workers employed in a bad job also search for good
jobs and transition immediately if matched. All newly matched workers become productive
instantaneously, so the evolution of period t employment in each type of job is described by
the laws of motion
ngt = (1 ¡ ½)ng;t¡1 + mgt; (1)
nbt = (1 ¡ stpgt)[(1 ¡ ½)nb;t¡1 + mbt]; (2)
where mgt;mbt denote, respectively, the number of newly ¯lled good and bad jobs, pgt is
the probability to ¯nd a good job, and st is the search intensity of workers in bad jobs (the
unemployed search intensity is constant and normalized to one).6 The product stpgt gives the
probability of a quit. The matching frictions of workers and ¯rms are represented by a constant
returns to scale matching function that determines the number of new matches between job
searchers and vacancies for each type of job as








Here uit; i = g;b; are the measures of unemployed workers searching for good and bad jobs,
vit are the measures of vacancies, the scale parameters Ãi re°ect the e±ciency of the matching
process, and » 2 (0;1) is the unemployment elasticity of new matches. In the presence of
on-the-job search, ugt + et workers search for good jobs in period t, where
et = st[(1 ¡ ½)nb;t¡1 + mbt] (5)
is the measure of e®ective search by employed workers. With the size of the labor force nor-
malized to one, the total number of jobless searchers is given by
ut = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1; (6)
where ut = ubt + ugt and nt = nbt + ngt.
The ratio of vacancies to searchers is a measure of the labor market tightness. For good
jobs, this tightness is given by µgt = vgt=(ugt +et), while for bad jobs it is simply µbt = vbt=ubt.
Thus, the aggregate labor market tightness, µt = vt=(ut + et), is distinct from the vacancy-
unemployment (v¡u) ratio, vt=ut, where vt = vgt+vbt. The job ¯nding probability (the worker
6The job heterogeneity and endogenous on-the-job search intensity are the key ingredients of Krause and
Lubik's (2006) model. However, in their model newly matched workers, whether having left an unemployment
spell or quit a job, become productive in the subsequent period. This timing assumption is adopted in Section 4.1.













so that a worker is more likely to ¯nd a job when the labor market is tight. Similarly, the ¯rm






it ; i = g;b; (9)
and rises when the labor market becomes slack.
2.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of measure one of in¯nitely lived family
members who pool their consumption risk, following Merz (1995). Each period the household
chooses consumption Ct, bond holdings Bt, real money balances Mt=Pt, and on-the-job search
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subject to the period budget constraint
Pt[wgtngt + wbtnbt + A(1 ¡ ngt ¡ nbt)] + Dt + Bt + Mt = PtCt + Bt¡1Rt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Tt (10)
and the structure of the labor market as described by Eqs. (1)¡(8). Here, ¯ 2 (0;1) is the
intertemporal discount factor, ¾ > 0 is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, Rt is the nominal
interest rate, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority. Family income
consists of wage income Ptwitnit from employment in a type i job, for i = g;b, unemployment
income PtA(1¡ngt¡nbt) and other income Dt. The latter consists of monopoly pro¯ts from the
¯nal good ¯rms, rents related to labor market frictions from intermediate good ¯rms, minus a
lump-sum transfer to ¯nance unemployment income. The disutility associated with work e®ort
is normalized to zero. However, search e®ort by workers matched with a bad job entails a utility
cost, with an elasticity parameter ¿ > 0. Consumption consists of a composite of di®erentiated




, where ² > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between these goods. Cost minimization of the household's consumption across
goods implies that the demand for each good is given by Ct(f) = [Pt(f)=Pt]¡²Ct, while the
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t is the marginal utility of consumption. Taking account of the labor market °ows
gives rise to an asset value of employment in each type of job. Speci¯cally,
Wgt = wgt ¡ A + Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ pg;t+1)Wg;t+1;
Wbt = wbt ¡ A ¡ ·s1+¿
t C¾
t
+ Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ pb;t+1)
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describe the household's marginal value of a family member matched with a good respectively
a bad job. This condition is standard for workers matched with a good job: the value is the
premium of the wage over the unemployment bene¯t plus the expected present value in the
next period. The latter is discounted by the time-varying discount factor that values future
consumption in present terms, ¯t;t+j = ¯(Ct+j=Ct)¡¾, for j = 1;2;:::, and by the probability
that the job is destroyed and no new good job is found. Accepting a good job generates
a surplus Wgt regardless of previous employment status, because the opportunity is always
unemployment. For a match with a bad job, the current return is diminished by the search
cost expressed in consumption units. The continuation value states that contingent on still or
again being matched with a bad job in the next period, the worker's value will be that of a bad
job, with probability 1 ¡ st+1pg;t+1, or that of a good job net of the future search cost (since
Wg does not incorporate this cost), with probability st+1pg;t+1. The assumption of directed
search, which leads to distinction between ugt and ubt in the pool of jobless searchers, implies
that the ex ante asset value of a worker is equal whether this worker be matched with a good
job or a bad job, so
pgtWgt = pbt
£






is the directed search arbitrage condition. Workers in bad jobs determine their optimal search










The marginal search cost is increasing in the worker's on-the-job search intensity and the
marginal bene¯t is decreasing in this argument. Also, the marginal bene¯t curve is shifted up
by an increase in the good job ¯nding probability or by an increase in the di®erential between
the asset values of employment in good and bad jobs, which consequently generate an increase
in search intensity.
2.3 Intermediate good producers and wage determination
Intermediate goods are sold in two perfectly competitive markets. The representative interme-
diate good i producing ¯rm uses a linear production technology given by
yit = atnit; i = g;b; (13)
8where aggregate productivity evolves stochastically according to
logat = ½a logat¡1 + "at; "at » N(0;¾2
a): (14)
The ¯rm chooses nit and vit to maximize pro¯ts by selling at a relative price zit. All ¯rms value
future pro¯ts with the household's time-varying discount factor because they are ultimately




¯t;t+1 [(zitat ¡ wit)nit ¡ °ivit]
subject to (1) and (9) if the ¯rm produces good g, or (2) and (9) if it produces good b. The




Jgt = zgtat ¡ wgt + Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)Jg;t+1;




Jbt = zbtat ¡ wbt + Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ st+1pg;t+1)Jb;t+1;
for good b producers. The Lagrange multiplier Jit is the good i producer's asset value of a
¯lled job. Pro¯t maximization requires this value to be equal to the average cost of ¯lling a
type i job opening. The average cost is the °ow cost of posting a vacancy times the number of
vacancies posted in order to ¯ll one job, which is the inverse of the vacancy ¯lling probability.
For bad jobs, the vacancy ¯lling probability is the product of the ¯rm matching rate and the
probability of no separation due to a quit. Combining the optimality conditions yields the job
creation conditions, which equate the cost of ¯lling a vacancy to its expected value:
°g
qgt










Wages are determined so as to split the surplus of a match between a worker and a ¯rm




it , where ´ 2 (0;1) is
7A good b producing ¯rm may reduce worker turnover and thereby increase the value of a match by o®ering
its workers a higher wage. In this case, the Nash bargaining solution is not applicable as a motivation for wage
determination through surplus splitting. Following Pissarides' (1994) theoretical analysis of on-the-job search, I
maintain the assumption of surplus splitting on the grounds that it is more appealing than other non-bargaining
approaches taken in this literature. Shimer (2006) analyzes a model of on-the-job search where wages are the
outcome of a strategic bargaining game. In the robustness analysis in Section 4.1, the timing of matching and
production implies that current wages do not a®ect the incentive for on-the-job search, so splitting the surplus
is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution.
9interpreted as a relative measure of the worker's bargaining power. The ¯rst order conditions
provide the surplus splitting rules, ´Jit = (1 ¡ ´)Wit, which result in the wage equations
wgt = ´
·




+ (1 ¡ ´)A (17)
wbt = ´
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A good job entails compensation for a fraction ´ of ¯rm revenue and the saving of hiring costs
that the ¯rm expects to enjoy thanks to the match, in addition to a fraction 1¡´ of the forgone
unemployment income. For workers in a bad job, in addition, more intensive search tends to
raise the wage as compensation for the larger search cost, but tends to reduce it to compensate
the ¯rm for the increased probability of a quit.









































2.4 Final good producers
The ¯nal good market is characterized by monopolistic competition. Each of a continuum
of ¯nal good producers, indexed by f 2 [0;1], combines intermediate goods b and g into a
di®erentiated good using a Cobb-Douglas production technology Yt(f) = Ygt(f)1¡®Ybt(f)®.
The share parameter ® 2 [0;1] of input b can be interpreted as a productivity di®erential: let
® < 1=2 so that productivity of input g exceeds that of b. A ¯rm f chooses the cost-minimizing
bundle of inputs that leads to the demand functions for inputs g and b,






















Final good producers set the price of their product in order to maximize discounted expected
real pro¯ts subject to demand from households and subject to Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)
10style price stickiness. Speci¯cally, a ¯xed fraction º 2 (0;1) of randomly chosen ¯rms does not
































and is related to the aggregate price index by
Pt = [(1 ¡ º)(P¤




To close the model, the monetary authority is assumed to follow the money growth rule
log¹t = (1 ¡ ½¹)log¹ + ½¹ log¹t¡1 + "¹t; "¹t » N(0;¾2
¹); (26)
where ¹t = Mt=Mt¡1 denotes the growth rate of the nominal money supply and ¹ is its steady
state value. This formulation of monetary policy follows most of the literature that deals with
the persistence of responses to monetary shocks, such as Chari et al. (2000), Dotsey and
King (2006), and Krause and Lubik (2007). The government has access to lump-sum taxes
and conducts a Ricardian ¯scal policy, so that the government budget constraint need not be
speci¯ed.
In equilibrium, market clearing implies that Bt = Bt¡1 = 0 and Mt = Mt¡1 + Tt in each
period. Intermediate good market clearing requires that
Yit = yit ¡ °ivit; i = g;b; (27)
where Yit ´
R
Yit(f)df, and ¯nal good market clearing requires that Yt(f) = Ct(f), for all








¡² df measures the relative price dispersion among ¯nal good producing
¯rms. A rational expectations equilibrium consists of initial values for the productivity level,
the growth rate of the nominal money supply, and the number of matched workers in both
types of jobs, as well as sequences for the endogenous variables satisfying equations (1)¡(28).
112.6 Calibration and steady state implications
The ensuing analysis uses a realistic calibration of model parameters to evaluate the model
quantitatively. The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1. The discount factor ¯ is
equal to 0.99, the relative risk aversion is ¾ = 1, ² = 11 is chosen to yield a steady state
gross markup of 1:1, the interest rate semielasticity of money demand is one, which is the
intermediate value considered by Dotsey and King (2006), and º = 0:67 is set to correspond to
an average frequency of price adjustment equal to three quarters, which is in line with recent
microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price changes. In the labor market, the bargaining
parameter is ´ = 0:5, following most of the literature on search frictions. The elasticity of
the matching functions, » = 0:5, is the midpoint between the values chosen by Krause and
Lubik (2006) and Nagyp¶ al (2007). The rate of job destruction is ½ = 0:1, and the steady state
unemployment rate 1 ¡ n = 0:05, which imply a steady state pool of unemployed searchers of
size u = 0:145.
With respect to on-the-job search, Krause and Lubik (2006) are followed in setting the
steady state quit rate equal to qr = pge=n = 0:06 and the search cost elasticity parameter
to ¿ = 0:1. The sensitivity of the results to the choice of ¿ is examined in Section 4.2. To
introduce job heterogeneity, the cost of posting a vacancy for a good job must exceed that of
posting a vacancy for a bad one. The former is set to °g = 0:16, as in Krause and Lubik, while
the latter is assumed to be eight times smaller: °b = 0:02. The share of input b in ¯nal output
is set to ® = 0:36, which is slightly below the value in Krause and Lubik. The e±ciency level of
the matching functions is Ãg = Ãb = 0:61 and is chosen to obtain an aggregate ¯rm matching
rate of q = 0:7, following den Haan et al. (2000).
Finally, the monetary growth process is characterized by an autoregressive parameter ½¹ =
0:50 and a standard deviation ¾¹ = 0:006, which are typical estimates. The autoregressive
coe±cient of the productivity shock is set to 0.95 and its standard error is set to ¾a = 0:0055.
The latter value is chosen to generate a standard deviation of output in the baseline model in
line with that observed in the U.S. data. The cyclical properties of the model are then assessed
by the ratios of the standard deviation of variables of interest to that of output.
With this calibration the system of steady state equations, collected in Appendix A, can
be solved numerically for the job type-speci¯c parameters. The resulting parameter values are
qg = 1:28, qb = 0:54, pg = 0:29, pb = 0:69, vg = 0:05, vb = 0:17, ug = 0:011, ub = 0:134,
ng = 0:60, nb = 0:35, mg = 0:06, mb = 0:09. The relative prices are zg = 0:48 and zb = 0:47
and the real wages are wg = 0:46 and wb = 0:45.8 The steady state search intensity is s = 0:48,
8The steady state wage di®erential is only two percent and it is di±cult to generate much larger wage
di®erentials with reasonable calibrations. However, the importance of on-the-job search in the model depends
on the di®erential between the asset values of employment in the two types of jobs. Calibrations that yield a
12such that e = 0:20, the scale parameter of the search cost is equal to · = 0:04, and the
unemployment income is A = 0:42. The model equations are log-linearized around their steady
state and summarized in Appendix B.
2.7 The dynamics of real marginal cost
This subsection addresses three questions. What is the wedge between real marginal cost and
real wages that arises in the presence of search frictions? How does this wedge a®ect the cyclical
dynamics of marginal cost? And what is the role of on-the-job search in this dynamics?
The job creation conditions (15) and (16) show the wedge between wages and marginal
cost in the presence of search frictions. Rewriting these conditions with the intermediate good

























If the labor market is frictionless, which is equivalent to °g = °b = 0, the relative price of each
intermediate good is equal to the ratio of the wage to the marginal product of labor, i.e. at,
such that the real marginal cost of ¯nal good production is given by the weighted average of
real wages over the marginal product. With search frictions in the labor market, the relative
price of each intermediate good depends also on the current average cost of hiring a worker,
adjusted for the expected, discounted saving of future hiring costs that a match entails. Thus,
hiring a worker generates a match that can be productive for multiple periods, but the current
relative price of an intermediate good only re°ects the cost of having a job ¯lled in the current
period. This is the cost of an employment relationship that the ¯rm incurs in addition to the
wage payment.9
The cyclical dynamics of the cost of an employment relationship may amplify the changes in
marginal cost that arise from °uctuations in wages. Consider the example of an expansionary
monetary shock. Because intermediate good ¯rms increase their vacancy posting in response
to the resulting increase in demand, new matches are formed, the labor market tightens, and
expectations about future labor market tightness rise as the new matches reduce the future
unemployment pool. Real wages increase as a result. The cost of an employment relationship
larger steady state di®erential in asset values do not necessarily imply a larger steady state wage di®erential. For
instance, shutting down on-the-job search by setting s = 0 raises the steady state wage di®erential but reduces
that between the asset values of employment.
9Goodfriend and King (2001) describe most labor transactions in advanced economies as governed by long-
term employment relationships between workers and ¯rms and also emphasize that the \e®ective" real marginal
cost may be more volatile than the real wage because of such employment relationships.
13also rises as long as the increase in current hiring cost that is brought about by the tighter labor
market is not exceeded by expected savings in discounted future hiring cost due to expectations
of even tighter future labor market conditions.
On-the-job search can diminish the increase in wages and in the cost of an employment
relationship. That is because searching workers provide ¯rms with an additional channel of
hiring, which is not available when all new workers have to come from the unemployment pool.
The additional vacancy posting prompted by the shock raises the good job ¯nding probability,
which induces workers in bad jobs to increase their search intensity for a good job. The resulting
expansion of the e®ective pool of search for good jobs dampens the tightening of the labor
market for such jobs. This in turn promotes the posting of more vacancies for good jobs, as it
slows down the decrease in the ¯rm matching rate. Thus, the complementarity between search
e®ort by workers and vacancy posting by ¯rms enables fast and persistent growth of vacancies
and employment without a rapidly tightening labor market. Employment and vacancies for
bad jobs can similarly grow without a rapid tightening in that labor market, as unemployed
searchers redirect their search toward bad jobs.10 The attenuation of the current and expected
future labor market tightening can mute the response of wages, the current and expected future
hiring cost, and hence of the cost of an employment relationship. As a result, with on-the-job
search in the labor market the marginal cost in the ¯nal good sector may display sluggishness.
The direction and quantitative importance of these e®ects are evaluated in the next section.
3 Implications of on-the-job search for business °uctuations
The model is analyzed via impulse-responses and simulations, and the analysis shows that
on-the-job search dampens the cyclical °uctuations in the components of marginal cost. The
reduced sensitivity of marginal cost to monetary or productivity shocks is key to explaining
the dampened in°ation response and the propagation toward real activity of such shocks.
The role of on-the-job search is evaluated by way of comparison with the associated model
without on-the-job search, which is obtained by setting the on-the-job search intensity st = s =
0 in all periods.11 It is also evaluated relative to an alternative source of real wage rigidity given
by a variant of the wage norm proposed by Hall (2005), to underline the drastically di®erent
implications of on-the-job search. Following the analysis of Krause and Lubik (2007), let wages
10The implications of on-the-job search for the labor market dynamics correspond to those described by Krause
and Lubik (2006).
11In this case the steady state equations under the baseline calibration imply the following job type-speci¯c
parameter values: qg = 0:75;qb = 0:26;pg = 0:50;pb = 1:41;vg = 0:08;vb = 0:13;ug = 0:12;ub = 0:025;ng =
0:60;nb = 0:35;mg = 0:06;mb = 0:04;zg = 0:48;zb = 0:45;wg = 0:46, and wb = 0:45. The absence of on-the-job
search reduces the steady state number of vacancies and new matches for bad jobs because such ¯rms do not
need to take into account that workers may quit.
14for each type of job i = g;b be determined according to
wit = ± ¹ wit + (1 ¡ ±)wN
it ;
where wN
it is a notional wage, ¹ wit is a wage norm and ± 2 [0;1]. Assume that the notional wage
is computed as the Nash bargaining outcome in the model without wage rigidity, and that the
steady state wage determines the wage norm for each type of job. Thus, two variants of the
model without on-the-job search are considered, characterized by ± = 0 (henceforth, standard
search model) or ± = 0:78 (henceforth, wage norm model). The latter value is chosen to match
the relative volatility of real wages in the baseline model with on-the-job search or in the U.S.
data, whichever is smaller.
3.1 Impulse responses
Figure 1 displays the dynamic responses of the model economy with on-the-job search (the
solid line), and the two model variants with only unemployed search, to a one percent increase
in the money growth rate. Looking over the plots in the ¯rst column, it is clear that on-the-job
search substantially dampens the response of in°ation; the response on impact is reduced by
more than half in comparison with the standard search model (the dashed line). This re°ects
the attenuated response of the real marginal cost, which in turn stems from a dampened
response of the real wage and of the cost of an employment relationship. In contrast, when the
wage norm is the source of real rigidity, the attenuation of the in°ation and real marginal cost
responses is less substantial, which is consistent with the irrelevance result of Krause and Lubik
(2007). Indeed, in this case the real wage response is dampened but the cost of an employment
relationship becomes more sensitive to the shock. Because the additional surplus of a match
generated by the monetary shock accrues largely to the ¯rm, and ¯rms post vacancies until
the hiring cost is equal to its match value, the wage rigidity provides ¯rms with an incentive
to post more vacancies. This ampli¯es the response of the current and expected future labor
market tightness and thereby the cost of an employment relationship. On-the-job search, on
the other hand, dampens changes in hiring costs. This mitigates °uctuations in the cost of
an employment relationship, despite a strengthened vacancy creation that is required to bring
hiring cost in line with the match value.
The second column of the ¯gure shows that the dampened marginal cost gives rise to a
strong propagation when workers search on-the-job. Output rises persistently and displays
a hump-shaped pattern. This re°ects developments in the labor market, where the response
of unemployment, vacancies, and the v ¡ u ratio is ampli¯ed and shows a gradual return to
steady state. Vacancy posting surges on impact because the rise in consumption demand
necessitates a commensurate increase in matches, while the number of unemployed workers is
15predetermined. Without on-the-job search there is much less persistence in the labor market
variables. Vacancies surge on impact but barely rise thereafter, so that the resulting decline in
unemployment is small and rapidly vanishing despite the unemployed being the only source of
employment growth. The wage norm ampli¯es the output and labor market responses, but to
a lesser extent than on-the-job search.
Figure 2 shows the dynamic responses of the cost of an employment relationship and its
components, the hiring cost and the expected, discounted future hiring cost, to the monetary
shock. The cost of an employment relationship rises because the former component increases
more than the latter in all three model variants. On-the-job search dampens the rise in both
components, whereas the wage norm ampli¯es the response in both components. Also, on-the-
job search attenuates the response of the expected, discounted future hiring cost more than that
of the current hiring cost, which is consistent with the anticipation that the pool of searchers
will not be exhausted as quickly when both employed and unemployed workers search for jobs.
For bad jobs in particular, the rise in the current hiring cost is mainly due to additional vacancy
posting necessitated by the worker quits that arise from increased search intensity, whereas the
redirection of search by unemployed workers toward bad jobs induces a substantial dampening
of the current and future labor market tightening.12
3.2 Model simulation
Simulation results can quantify the e®ects of on-the-job search on the model dynamics that
are illustrated by the impulse-responses. Table 2 reports standard deviations and correlations
computed from simulation results generated by the three models, both unconditional and con-
ditional on monetary shocks or productivity shocks. Statistics for the model economies are
computed as the average of 1,000 simulated histories of 178 quarters. All variables are re-
ported in logs and are HP ¯ltered with smoothing parameter equal to 1,600. These numbers
can be compared to similar statistics computed from quarterly U.S. data covering the period
1964:1¡2008:2, which are displayed in the ¯rst column of the table.13
The results corroborate the account of the role of on-the-job search that is highlighted by
the impulse-responses. That is, the volatility of in°ation, marginal cost, wages, and the cost of
12Note that in the absence of on-the-job search, the responses of the cost of an employment relationship and
its components are identical for good jobs and for bad jobs, because the dynamics of labor market tightness is
identical for both types of jobs.
13Output is measured as the seasonally adjusted real GDP, converted to per capita terms by dividing by the
civilian non-institutional population aged 16 and older. In°ation is the growth rate of the consumer price index.
The real wage is the seasonally adjusted average hourly earnings of the private sector divided by the consumer
price index. Unemployment is the civilian unemployment rate of persons aged 16 and older. Vacancies are
measured by the Conference Board's help-wanted advertising index.
16an employment relationship drops relative to that of output. The relative standard deviation
of in°ation in the presence of on-the-job search closely matches that of the U.S. consumer price
index. In contrast, a wage norm reduces wage volatility but exacerbates °uctuations in the cost
of an employment relationship, such that the relative volatility of marginal cost and in°ation
is dampened to a lesser extent. These conclusions remain unchanged when the volatilities are
conditional on either monetary shocks or productivity shocks.
In the labor market with on-the-job search, °uctuations in unemployment, vacancies and
the v ¡ u ratio explain more than two thirds of the observed volatility in the U.S. data. At
the same time, °uctuations in the labor market tightness, i.e. the ratio of vacancies to search
of employed and unemployed workers, are dampened substantially by the interaction between
vacancies and employed search: tightness is more than three times less volatile than the v ¡ u
ratio. Having workers search on-the-job does not increase the relative volatility of vacancies and
the v ¡ u ratio. Notably, even conditional on productivity shocks on-the-job search actually
reduces the relative standard deviation of vacancies and raises that of the v ¡ u ratio only
slightly. However, on-the-job search generates a more persistent response of these variables, as
re°ected in the autocorrelations reported in the table, and also generates a negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies (i.e. the Beveridge curve), although the correlation
is less negative than in the U.S. data. In the standard search model, i.e. absent on-the-
job search, the relative volatility of vacancies is large, especially if conditional on monetary
shocks but even in response to productivity shocks. The latter ¯nding is at odds with the
ampli¯cation puzzle that is emphasized by Shimer (2005a). With a predetermined number of
unemployed searchers, a shock that necessitates an instant adjustment of matches induces such
a spike in vacancy creation. However, it also yields a small (even negative) autocorrelation
of vacancies, and fails to generate a Beveridge curve. In the next section it is shown that
this ampli¯cation of vacancies stems from the timing assumption that new matches become
productive instantaneously.
At this point the conclusion can be drawn that on-the-job search substantially improves the
properties of the sticky price model with search frictions in terms of marginal cost, in°ation
and output dynamics, as well as in terms of the labor market dynamics of unemployment,
vacancies and the v ¡ u ratio.
4 Robustness analysis
In this section the foregoing analysis is veri¯ed for robustness to the timing assumption of
matching and production of workers. In addition, the sensitivity of the results to two key
parameters, the search cost elasticity and the degree of price stickiness, is investigated.
174.1 Timing of matching and production
Does on-the-job search continue to attenuate the °uctuations in wages and the cost of an
employment relationship, the result emphasized in the previous section, when a match becomes
productive in the period following the time of its creation? This timing assumption is more
conventional in the labor market search literature. Moreover, it could be conjectured that the
sensitivity of the cost of an employment relationship to shifts in production in the absence of
on-the-job search is generated by the large °uctuations in the v¡u ratio in the standard search
model analyzed in the previous section. Below it is shown, to the contrary, that when new
matches start producing with a lag, on-the-job search ampli¯es the °uctuations in vacancies
and the v¡u ratio substantially but dampens those in the cost of an employment relationship.
The following equations change. In the labor market, matches are accumulated according
to the motion laws
ngt = (1 ¡ ½)(ng;t¡1 + mgt);
nbt = (1 ¡ ½)[(1 ¡ stpgt)nb;t¡1 + mbt];
where nit, i = g;b, is the employment available at the end of period t. The measure of e®ective
on-the-job search and the number of jobless searchers is, respectively,
et = stnb;t¡1;
ut = 1 ¡ nt¡1:
For households, the timing implies that the asset value of an employed worker in a good and a
bad job, respectively, becomes
Wgt = wgt ¡ A + Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ pgt)Wg;t+1;
Wbt = wbt ¡ A ¡ ·s1+¿
t C¾
t + Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)[(1 ¡ pbt ¡ stpgt)Wb;t+1 + stpgtWg;t+1];
whereas the directed search arbitrage condition and the on-the-job search intensity condition
are given by14
pgtEt¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)Wg;t+1 = pbtEt¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)Wb;t+1;
(1 + ¿)·s¿
tC¾
t = pgtEt¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)(Wg;t+1 ¡ Wb;t+1):
Intermediate good ¯rms' production technology is given by
yit = atni;t¡1; i = g;b;
14In contrast to the baseline model of Section 2, the on-the-job search intensity depends on expected future
wages. Since real wages are renegotiated every period, ¯rms with bad jobs cannot a®ect the incentive for on-
the-job search by o®ering a higher wage. Hence, splitting the surplus of a match between worker and ¯rm
corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution.
18and their optimization problem generates the job creation conditions
°g
qgt
= Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½)
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Finally, using the surplus splitting rule, the directed search arbitrage condition and the on-the-





















The description of ¯nal good producers and the monetary authority remains unchanged.
The calibration is adjusted in three respects. First, the standard deviation of the produc-
tivity shock is raised slightly to ¾a = 0:0056 in order to match the standard deviation of U.S.
GDP. Second, the steady state measure of unemployed searchers is set to u = 0:145 (implying
n = 0:855) to match the value implied by the de¯nition of steady state unemployed searchers
in the baseline model. Third, the degree of real wage rigidity in the wage norm model is set
to match the relative standard deviation of real wages in the U.S. data, which requires that
± = 0:73.15
Table 3 displays the simulation results. The e®ects of on-the-job search are qualitatively
similar to those presented in the previous section: on-the-job search dampens the °uctuations
in wages and the cost of an employment relationship, and consequently induces a substantial
reduction in the volatility of marginal cost and in°ation. In contrast, the wage norm ampli¯es
the °uctuations in the cost of an employment relationship, such that marginal cost and in°ation
volatility are dampened to a lesser extent. Comparing these results quantitatively to those
reported in Table 2, the °uctuations in prices and costs are substantially larger with the
conventional timing, in particular when generated by monetary shocks. Moreover, in°ation and
marginal cost display very small autocorrelation, and the correlation of in°ation and output
is negative, even conditional on monetary shocks. This re°ects the absence of a margin of
15The steady state equations imply similar job type-speci¯c parameter values as those reported in Section 2.6:
qg = 1:37;qb = 0:48;pg = 0:27;pb = 0:77;vg = 0:04;vb = 0:18;ug = 0:033;ub = 0:112;ng = 0:54;nb = 0:31;mg =
0:06;mb = 0:09;zg = 0:48;zb = 0:46;wg = 0:46, and wb = 0:45.
19instantaneous adjustment of production, which requires relative prices to adjust to dampen the
change in consumption demand on impact of a monetary shock. In the labor market, on-the-
job search increases the °uctuations in unemployment fourfold, those of vacancies twofold and
those of the v ¡ u ratio threefold, whereas it makes the °uctuations in labor market tightness
almost three times smaller than those of the v ¡ u ratio.16 The labor market variables are
highly autocorrelated and a Beveridge curve obtains, even in the standard search model and
the wage norm model.
4.2 Key parameter values
As emphasized above, the complementarity between ¯rms' vacancy creation and workers' on-
the-job search intensity gives rise to a procyclical °ow of job-to-job transitions. Thus, the
endogenous movements in search intensity are central to explaining, on the one hand, the large
°uctuations in the v¡u ratio that re°ect the powerful propagation of shocks, and, on the other
hand, the muted changes in labor market tightness that translate into rigidity of marginal cost
and in°ation. Figure 3 illustrates the importance of the search intensity for the dynamics of
in°ation in the baseline model of Section 2, by varying the elasticity of the search cost. As
the search cost becomes less elastic, a worker's search intensity is more sensitive to economic
conditions and hence the relative volatility of in°ation is reduced. The e®ect is particularly
strong for the case of money growth shocks.
Another key parameter is the degree of price stickiness. Krause and Lubik (2006) analyze
the role of on-the-job search for the labor market variables in a real business cycle model,
where nominal prices have no real e®ects and productivity shocks are the only source of °uc-
tuations. The left panel of Figure 4 depicts the e®ects on the v ¡ u ratio of relaxing each
of these restrictions in the baseline model of Section 2. As ¯rms face more nominal rigidity,
productivity shocks generate an exceedingly large relative standard deviation of the v¡u ratio.
If conditional on monetary shocks, the size of this relative volatility does not depend much on
the degree of price stickiness, even for very small degrees of price stickiness. The right panel
shows a comparable ¯gure generated by simulations of the model with no margin of instanta-
neous production adjustment. Interestingly, an increase in price stickiness now dampens the
°uctuations in the v ¡ u ratio induced by productivity shocks. The relative volatility arising
from monetary shocks is again not sensitive to the degree of price stickiness.
The opposite relationship between price stickiness and labor market °uctuations under the
two timing assumptions is a consequence of the di®erent impact of a productivity shock. That
16The °uctuations conditional on productivity shocks in unemployment, and hence those in the v ¡ u ratio,
are somewhat smaller than the statistics reported by Krause and Lubik (2006). The gap can be accounted for by
the simultaneous e®ects of a positive degree of price stickiness, the speci¯cation of the cost of on-the-job search
e®ort in terms of utility, and a larger steady state pool of unemployed searchers.
20impact is particularly large for vacancies under the timing of the baseline model and particularly
large for relative prices with the conventional timing. Hence, in the baseline model, a positive
productivity shock induces a downward adjustment of employment in the short run, as demand
for goods with previously set prices is ¯xed and can be met with fewer workers. That is followed
by an expansion of employment and production as ¯rms gradually adjust their prices. These
dynamics are highlighted by Gal¶ ³ (1999) in a sticky price model with a competitive labor
market. Stickier prices then induce larger °uctuations in the labor market by requiring a larger
initial downward adjustment of vacancies and employment. With the conventional timing, on
the contrary, employment is predetermined so there is no downward employment adjustment
in the short run. Relative prices of intermediate goods must therefore fall to bring aggregate
consumption in line with increased production. But that price decline dampens the increase in
these ¯rms' incentive for new vacancy creation and thus the increase in the v¡u ratio. Stickier
prices require a larger downward adjustment of relative prices, such that the °uctuations in
the v ¡ u ratio due to productivity shocks are diminished.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper demonstrates that introducing on-the-job search in an otherwise standard New
Keynesian model with search frictions substantially improves the model from two perspectives.
First, it reduces the sensitivity of marginal cost to monetary or productivity shocks, which
dampens the resulting in°ation response and increases the propagation toward output. Sec-
ond, it also improves the cyclical labor market properties of the model by generating sizable
°uctuations in and large autocorrelation of the key labor market variables, and a Beveridge
curve.
The analysis also produces insight in the dynamics of the model with a standard labor
market, where workers cannot search on-the-job. If new matches become productive instan-
taneously, vacancies and the v ¡ u ratio display large volatility, even if this is generated by
productivity shocks, but small autocorrelation and the model fails to produce a Beveridge
curve. This contrasts with the case where new matches become productive with a lag, in which
the labor market variables display a lack of ampli¯cation but are highly autocorrelated and in
which a Beveridge curve obtains. On-the-job search brings about substantial improvement of
the de¯ciencies associated with each timing assumption.
21A Steady state
The following steady state equations are used to obtain values of the job type speci¯c parameters
based on the baseline calibration.
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This appendix describes the log-linearized approximation of the model. Firm and worker
matching rates are written in terms of labor market tightness using the log-linear approximation
to Eqs. (7)¡(9): ^ pit = (1 ¡ »)^ µit and ^ qit = ¡»^ µit, for i = g;b. In addition, the approximation
of the stochastic discount factor ^ ¯t;t+1 = ¡( ^ Rt ¡ ^ ¼t+1) is used.
1. Consumption Euler equation, (11):
¾ ^ Ct = ¾Et ^ Ct+1 ¡ ( ^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1)
2. New Keynesian Phillips curve, (24) and (25):
^ ¼t = ¯Et^ ¼t+1 +
(1 ¡ º)(1 ¡ ¯º)
º
^ zt
3. Money growth, (26):
^ ¹t = ½¹^ ¹t¡1 + "¹t
4. Evolution real money balances, mdt ´ Mt=Pt:
^ mdt = ^ mdt¡1 + ^ ¹t ¡ ^ ¼t
5. Money demand, (12):




6. Intermediate good production, (13):
^ yit = ^ at + ^ nit; i = g;b
7. Productivity, (14):
^ at = ½a^ at¡1 + "at
8. Intermediate good market clearing, (27):
Yi^ Yit = yi^ yit ¡ °ivi^ vit; i = g;b
9. Relative price intermediate goods, (21), (22):
^ zit = ^ zt + ^ Ct ¡ ^ Yit; i = g;b
10. Real marginal cost, (23):
^ zt = (1 ¡ ®)^ zgt + ®^ zbt
2311. Employment good jobs, (1):
^ ngt = (1 ¡ ½)^ ng;t¡1 + ½
³
^ vgt ¡ »^ µgt
´
12. Employment bad jobs, (2):
^ nbt = (1¡½)(1¡spg)^ nb;t¡1+[1¡(1¡½)(1¡spg)]
³






^ st + (1 ¡ »)^ µgt
i
13. E®ective on-the-job search, (5):
^ et = ^ st + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ spg)^ nb;t¡1 + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ spg)]
³
^ vbt ¡ »^ µbt
´
14. Unemployed search, (6):
ug^ ugt + ub^ ubt = ¡(1 ¡ ½)(ng^ ng;t¡1 + nb^ nb;t¡1)
15. Labor market tightness good jobs:











16. Labor market tightness bad jobs:
^ µbt = ^ vbt ¡ ^ ubt
17. Good job creation, (15):












¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)( ^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1) + ¯(1 ¡ ½)»Et^ µg;t+1
18. Bad job creation, (16):

















^ st + (1 ¡ »)^ µgt
i
19. Wage good job, (17):
wg ^ wgt = ´zg(^ zgt + ^ at) ¡ ´¯(1 ¡ ½)pg
°g
qg




2420. Wage bad job, (18):
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21. Directed search arbitrage condition, (19):
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28Figure 1: Responses to a positive one percent money growth shock
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29Figure 2: Responses of the cost of an employment relationship to a positive one percent money
growth shock
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30Figure 3: In°ation sensitivity to the search cost elasticity






































31Figure 4: Labor market sensitivity to the degree of price stickiness































New matches productive instantaneously
 
 
















32Table 1: Baseline calibration
Preferences and ¯nal good technology
¯ 0.99 discount factor
¾ 1 relative risk aversion
² 11 demand elasticity
º 0.67 fraction of ¯rms not adjusting price
® 0.36 share of input b in ¯nal output
¿ 0.1 search cost elasticity parameter
Labor market
°g 0.16 good job creation cost
°b 0.02 bad job creation cost
» 0.5 search elasticity of matches
´ 0.5 worker share of surplus
½ 0.1 separation rate
1 ¡ n 0.05 unemployment rate
Ãi 0.61 matching e±ciency type i = g;b jobs
qr 0.06 quit rate
Productivity and monetary shock process
½¹ 0.50 autoregressive coe±cient monetary shock
¾¹ 0.006 standard deviation monetary shock
½a 0.95 autoregressive coe±cient productivity shock
¾a 0.0055 standard deviation productivity shock
33Table 2: Business cycle properties of U.S. economy and simulated model economies
U.S. Model with Model without on-the-job search
on-the-job search ± = 0:00 ± = 0:78
Relative Std. ¹&a ¹ a ¹&a ¹ a ¹&a ¹ a
Output (Y ) 1.50 1.50 0.83 1.23 0.79 0.31 0.72 1.17 0.52 1.05
In°ation (¼) 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.84 1.74 0.52 0.53 0.82 0.43
Marginal cost { 0.61 0.60 0.61 2.47 4.60 1.81 1.28 1.78 1.13
Wage 0.71 0.30 0.39 0.24 1.62 3.41 0.97 0.30 0.48 0.23
Cost emp. rel. { 6.14 8.49 4.68 19.2 35.3 14.3 21.9 35.4 17.1
Unempl. (u) 7.25 5.28 6.27 4.77 3.73 7.25 2.58 4.68 7.20 3.82
Vacancies (v) 8.83 8.77 12.0 6.77 12.4 23.8 8.81 11.7 20.7 8.22
v ¡ u ratio 15.8 11.3 14.1 9.85 12.2 23.4 8.59 13.2 21.5 10.2
Tightness { 3.14 3.76 2.81 12.2 23.4 8.59 13.2 21.5 10.2
Quit rate { 12.1 16.5 9.42 { { { { { {
Autocorrelation
Output 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.92 0.80 0.50 0.85 0.85 0.66 0.89
In°ation 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.39 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.48 0.45
Marginal cost { 0.28 0.18 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.31 0.39 0.38 0.40
Unempl. 0.91 0.80 0.71 0.87 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.69 0.56 0.81
Vacancies 0.91 0.29 0.15 0.49 -0.17 -0.14 -0.20 0.11 -0.02 0.32
v ¡ u ratio 0.91 0.66 0.52 0.79 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.44 0.27 0.63
Correlation
Y , ¼ 0.36 0.14 0.92 -0.18 0.19 0.99 -0.26 0.15 0.97 -0.22
v, u -0.93 -0.25 -0.09 -0.43 0.22 0.21 0.24 -0.12 0.06 -0.33
Notes: Standard deviations are relative to that of output. ¹ and a denote results conditional
on monetary and productivity shocks respectively.
34Table 3: Business cycle properties of U.S. economy and simulated model economies: New
matches become productive with a lag
U.S. Model with Model without on-the-job search
on-the-job search ± = 0:00 ± = 0:73
Relative Std. ¹&a ¹ a ¹&a ¹ a ¹&a ¹ a
Output (Y ) 1.50 1.50 0.26 1.46 0.80 0.07 0.80 1.01 0.13 1.00
In°ation (¼) 0.30 0.64 3.04 0.37 1.17 11.0 0.67 0.92 6.10 0.50
Marginal cost { 3.10 17.2 0.94 6.08 55.2 3.67 4.58 32.5 1.95
Wage 0.71 1.57 8.86 0.38 3.16 30.0 1.76 0.71 4.88 0.34
Cost emp. rel. { 53.8 305 12.3 68.8 632 40.6 91.0 664 33.6
Unempl. (u) 7.25 4.73 5.90 4.69 1.21 6.11 1.09 3.09 6.13 3.02
Vacancies (v) 8.83 5.61 8.89 5.49 2.40 15.6 1.98 5.46 14.0 5.21
v ¡ u ratio 15.8 9.33 12.2 9.24 3.12 17.3 2.73 7.69 16.6 7.46
Tightness { 3.21 3.87 3.19 3.12 17.3 2.73 7.69 16.6 7.46
Quit rate { 8.33 12.4 8.17 { { { { { {
Autocorrelation
Output 0.86 0.91 0.81 0.92 0.76 0.56 0.76 0.86 0.65 0.86
In°ation 0.48 0.12 -0.03 0.43 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.25
Marginal cost { -0.05 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.07
Unempl. 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.93 0.84 0.68 0.88 0.89 0.76 0.90
Vacancies 0.91 0.79 0.51 0.81 0.55 0.26 0.69 0.72 0.39 0.76
v ¡ u ratio 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.91 0.75 0.50 0.83 0.85 0.62 0.87
Correlation
Y , ¼ 0.36 -0.15 -0.30 -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.34 -0.17 -0.28 -0.25
v, u -0.93 -0.62 -0.32 -0.64 -0.42 -0.10 -0.54 -0.58 -0.23 -0.61
Notes: Standard deviations are relative to that of output. ¹ and a denote results conditional
on monetary and productivity shocks respectively.
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